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ABSTRACT 
 
Using data on a large sample of electronics firms in seven large states from a newly 
developed employer-employee matched database (Longitudinal Employer Household 
Dynamics, LEHD), we examine the impact of human resource management (HRM) 
practices and technology on worker productivity.  Motivated by extensive site visit 
research in the semiconductor industry in which we observe the interaction of HRM 
practices, technology and product markets, we use linked employer-employee data to test 
the generalizability of our case study observations.  Specifically, we examine the 
relationship between product markets and HRM practices.  Empirically, we identify 
HRM clusters for firms based on firm-level observations of nine measures of HRM 
outcomes.  Next, we use principal components analysis to examine the relationships 
between the HRM measures. Then we use these principal components and their 
interactions with R&D investment as explanatory variables in a worker productivity 
regression.  We find that there are large differences on the impact of human resource 
practices on labor productivity across levels of technological investment.  Our 
preliminary results indicate that firms with high levels of R&D investment and HRM 
systems with multiple ports of entry, performance incentives, and lower turnover have 
higher worker productivity than comparable high-R&D firms without these HRM 
practices.  Similarly, firms with low R&D that implement HRM systems with 
performance incentives have higher productivity than low R&D firms without 
performance incentives.  These results suggest that high R&D firms are more likely to 
buy new skills compared to low R&D firms, and yet these high R&D firms suffer if they 
lose too many experienced workers.  These findings are consistent with the implications 
of our “make versus buy” model of workforce skill adjustment as a response to 
technological change. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
 As the pace of technological change has quickened, and as global competition has 
shortened product life cycles, firms have had to rethink their technology investment 
strategies and their human resource management practices in order to remain competitive.  
This paper examines the relationship between firm-level research and development 
investment (R&D) and firms’ human resource management (HRM) practices in a high-
tech industry. 
 
In a series of site visits of leading semiconductor fabrication plants as part of the 
Sloan UC-Berkeley Competitive Semiconductor Manufacturing Program we observed 
that firms often tailored their HRM system to their product market.  Anecdotally, firms in 
markets where products obsolesced quickly appear to be more likely to implement spot 
market-based HRM practices while firms in markets with long product lives are more 
likely to implement internal labor market-based HRM systems.  Using linked employer-
employee data from the US Census Bureau we can test whether our anecdotal evidence 
generalizes across the universe of semiconductor and electronics firms. 
 
There are several channels through which firm R&D and HRM decisions may be 
related.  If technology and labor force skills are complements in firms’ production 
functions, and if HRM systems impact the cost of acquiring, developing, and retaining 
the portfolio of skills in a firm, then firms’ choice of HRM system affects their ability to 
adjust worker skill levels to maximize the value of their technological investments.  For 
example, if firms need to augment the skill of their workforce to complement an 
investment in technology, they face a traditional “make versus buy” problem.  Firms can 
structure their HRM system to develop the necessary skills in-house or they can structure 
their HRM to attract workers with the necessary skills on the external market.  Also, 
workers gain skills directly from learning-by-doing in their R&D activities, which 
triggers the firm to enact HRM policies that retain the increasingly productive knowledge 
workers.  Additionally, firms’ product strategies directly affect both their R&D choices 
and their HRM choice (Lazear (1998) and Baron and Kreps (1999)). 
 
Although the relationship of technological change, compensation and tenure at the 
individual level has been well-studied, surprisingly little is known about the relationship 
between technological change and firms’ HRM decisions. Previous research on this topic 
has been either case study oriented or has utilized data from broad establishment-level 
surveys.  Motivated and informed by our direct observation on semiconductor firms, this 
project connects these micro and macro approaches by using data that allows us to 
capitalize on the strengths of each type of research.  Using data from the Longitudinal 
Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Program, we are able to examine the HRM 
practices and firm-level characteristics for many firms in seven states, which allow us to 
build on the breadth of the establishment-level survey research.  Additionally, we can 
track the outcomes of the universe of workers within each establishment. We use this 
broad sample and detailed measures to examine the HRM-productivity link in the 
electronics industry, where technological investment is a critical strategic variable.       
 
 Using data from the LEHD program for seven large states over the period 1992-
1997 we estimate the relationship between the interaction of technological investment 
and HRM practices and firm performance. Specifically, we look at the impact of R&D 
and HRM systems on firm performance within the electronics industry (SIC 35 and 36). 
Although firms in the electronics industry have a high level of R&D investment relative 
to other industries, there is a large variance in investment between firms within the 
industry.  This variance can be observed in the length of product life cycles: from twelve 
months for fast-evolving consumer-based products such as graphics chips, to five years 
or more for slowly-evolving analog products. Studying one industry simplifies the 
analysis of the relationship of R&D and HRM by focusing on firms that are fairly 
comparable in structure and face similar market trends and measurement problems. 
 
The LEHD program links universal and longitudinal records on employees’ 
earnings and employment from states’ Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems with 
detailed cross-sectional data from a variety of Census and BLS data collection programs 
on households and employers.  We use the UI records on workers’ outcomes within 
establishments to construct a variety of measures of establishment-level HRM outcomes 
for high-educated and low-educated workers.  We then link these HRM measures with 
plant and firm characteristics collected from the Census Bureau’s Economic Censuses 
and Census/NSF R&D surveys. 
 
 We employ principal components analysis to identify groups of correlated HRM 
measures.  We then regress worker productivity on the principal HRM components 
interacted with clockspeed.  While these results illustrate the relationships between 
performance, HRM practices and R&D, they do not describe the HRM practices actually 
implemented by establishments.  Implementation of HRM systems is more important 
than individual characteristics because there are synergies and complementarities in 
HRM practices (Kandel and Lazear, 1992; and Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). We perform 
a cluster analysis of firms and HRM measures to identify and describe the most common 
HRM systems. 
 
We find that there are large differences in the impact of human resource practices 
on labor productivity across levels of technological investment.  For firms with high 
levels of R&D, HRM practices for high-educated workers associated with having 
multiple ports of entry, a high hiring rate1, and awarding performance incentives are 
positively related to worker productivity. High R&D firms implementing HRM systems 
for low-educated workers with performance incentives, high hiring rate, and low turnover 
have higher productivity. For low R&D firms, high-educated HRM practices that 
demonstrate performance incentives are positively related to productivity, while for low-
educated workers, firms offering job ladders with varying amounts of career development 
so that workers’ earnings streams diverge over time demonstrate higher productivity.  
These findings are consistent with the implications of a “make versus buy” model of 
workforce skills where the costs of training workers to acquire new skills associated with 
                                                          
1
 The measures of hiring rate and turnover are directly tied to firm employment growth so these measures 
may not capture HRM system outcomes as much as they capture firm growth. In the next iteration of this 
paper, we will explore this distinction. 
a technological innovation are proportional to the size of the innovation, while the 
adjustment costs of hiring workers with the necessary skills are invariant to the size of the 
innovation.  Specifically, firms with a high rate of technological change that buy new 
skills on the external market and selectively retain experienced workers will demonstrate 
higher productivity than comparable firms with a less flexible HRM system.  Also, firms 
with a low rate of technological change that demonstrate performance incentives and 
selective retention will have higher productivity than comparable firms that do not 
demonstrate these HRM outcomes. 
 
 The next section briefly describes previous research on firm’s earnings structure 
and performance with special focus on studies that explore the role of technology or that 
use matched employer-employee data. Then we describe a conceptual framework of the 
interrelationship of firms’ R&D investment decisions and firms’ HRM decisions on 
productivity.  Next we describe the data set and our measurements for HRM practices, 
R&D investment, firm performance and other firm characteristics.  Then we present some 
preliminary statistical results on firm performance, HRM, and R&D.  Finally, we discuss 
our next steps. 
 
 
2. Technology, HRM Practices, and Productivity 
 
Using linked employer-employee data to analyzing the impact of HRM practices 
and technological investments on firm performance builds directly on the long line of 
literature exploring the link between HRM practices and firm performance. We also draw 
upon key aspects of the skill-biased technical change literature, the internal labor market 
literature, and the firm clockspeed literature.  
 
Previous analysis of the relationship between HRM and performance focused on 
detailed understanding and knowledge of a specific firm (Ichniowski, 1992; and Berg et 
al, 1996), in-depth research of an industry (Kelley, 1996; Ichniowski, Shaw, and 
Prennushi, 1997; Brown et al., 1999; and Brown and Campbell, 2001), or analysis of 
representative surveys (Huselid, 1995; Huselid and Becker, 1996; and Black and Lynch, 
2001).  The survey-driven analysis is marked by using large data sets on employers to 
measure both firm performance and HRM practices.  Our approach is to use novel data 
from the LEHD program to build on the previous research of the HRM-firm performance 
link.   
 
Building on the work of Davis and Haltiwanger (1991), Doms, Dunne, and 
Troske (1997), and Jensen and Troske (1997) who use the Longitudinal Research 
Database (LRD) to study changes in wage distributions at the plant level, Black and 
Lynch (2001) use the LRD linked with a nationally representative survey of work 
practices to estimate an augmented Cobb-Douglass production function.  The authors use 
both within and Generalized Method of Moments estimators and find that how HRM 
practices are implemented is more important than which HRM practices are 
implemented.  We extend on their analysis by focusing on one specific industry where we 
can employ more detailed industry controls, and instead of using self-reported measures 
of HRM practices we focus on HRM outcomes measured for all workers in each 
establishment.  
 
Our analysis of the relationship of technology and HRM practices complements 
the extensive body of literature on the relationship of technological change and workers' 
wages.  The existing literature consists of two components.  One line of literature 
examines the relationship between technology and wages, while the other examines the 
direct impact of technology on work organization.  There has been extensive research 
documenting the impact of technology on wages and work at the individual level. 
However, currently little is known about how firms’ R&D decisions affect firms' 
compensation policies.  Below we track the evolution of the two arcs of the technical 
change literature to motivate our firm-driven approach. 
 
The foundation of the line of literature linking technological change to wages uses 
Current Population Survey (CPS) data to document and analyze compensation patterns in 
the United States.  Bound and Johnson (1992), Levy and Murnane (1992), Katz and 
Murphy (1992), and Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) all use CPS data and observe shifts 
in wage levels that are consistent with the hypothesized effects of skill-biased 
technological change.  Additionally, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) demonstrate that 
within-group wage variation comprises a larger portion of the increase in inequality than 
between-group variation.  Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), and Allen (1997) find 
similar results using industry-level data. 
 
One channel through which the observed shifts in wage structures can be 
explained is that technical change augments workers’ skills as they learn to use new 
technologies and new processes.  Krueger (1993), Handel (1998), DiNardo and Pischke 
(1997), and Entorf and Kramarz (1997) analyze the returns to specific technologies on 
workers’ wages and find a significant impact.  However, DiNardo and Pischke also 
demonstrate the magnitude of the computer-use premium is similar to the pencil-use 
premium, while Entorf and Kramarz show that workers who begin to use a new 
technology are already more skilled and more highly paid than their peers. 
 
Combining firm-level technology data and individual-level labor market data 
allows an analysis of firms’ technology and HRM decisions.  Most of the above studies 
show that wage structures are changing between plants and within industries and indicate 
that technology plays a role in the evolution of wage structures. They connect technology 
to changing skill demand and then to changes in wages. However, these firm-level 
decisions occur simultaneously. 
 
Another channel that technology can impact worker and firm outcomes is through 
work organization.  Hunter and Lafkas (1998) and Bresnahan et al, (2002) demonstrate 
that the impact of technology on work depends upon the HR system in which it was 
imbedded.  Zuboff (1988) shows how digital technology has dramatically changed work 
by automating routine tasks and allowing some workers to perform new kinds of work in 
both manufacturing and service companies.  Levy and Murnane (1996), Autor, Levy, and 
Murnane (1999), Barley and Orr (1997) and Brown et al (1997) argue that job tasks 
include routine or rule-based problem-solving operations, which can easily be done by a 
computer, and exceptions or model-based problem-solving, which cannot be done 
economically by a computer. The use of computers results in these exceptions shaping 
the demand for labor both in terms of quantity and skills.  
 
Technological change is also related to organizational change within a firm which 
may impact both workers’ outcomes and firm performance.  Technology may be 
correlated with decentralized decision-making (Cappelli, 1996; and Bresnahan, et al, 
2002), changes in bargaining power (O’Shaughnessy, Levine, and Cappelli, 1999; and 
Caroli and Van Reenen, 1998).  
 
Our analysis looks at HRM practices within firms and builds on the work of 
Prendergast (1996) and Doeringer and Piore (1971).  Pendergast provides an overview of 
the empirical literature on how compensation practices influence productivity and 
earnings.  He concludes that theoretical and data limitations make it difficult to produce 
testable hypotheses that would distinguish the competing theories of incentives and 
outcomes.  Using data from a single firm, Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) find that 
some aspects of the employment relationship are consistent with the theory of internal 
labor markets.  The firm has a clear hierarchy of jobs and promotions and a strong 
relationship between jobs and pay that leads to a tendency toward long careers.  
However, they find little evidence of “ports of entry” into the firm, since the firm does a 
fair amount of outside hiring even at higher levels.  Lazear and Oyer (2003) use matched 
data from the Swedish Employers Confederation from 1970 to 1990.  They find that the 
strict model of internal labor markets does not seem to hold.  External forces play a large 
role in firms' wage setting policies.  Topel and Ward (1992) produce results that question 
the standard notion of human capital investment and lifecycle earnings growth.  Using a 
longitudinal panel of earnings records from the social security program, they observe 
high mobility and earnings growth among young male workers that is more consistent 
with matching models and on-the-job search than internal labor markets.  Once good 
matches are found, these workers eventually settle down into jobs that are more stable.  
  
 In addition to the effects of human capital acquisition and internal labor markets 
on earnings profiles, industry characteristics such as rate of technological change, or 
“clockspeed” should affect the firm's human resource practices.  Influenced by the 
evolution of fruit flies, Fine (1998) analyzes how each industry evolves at different rates, 
or "clockspeeds," depending “on its product clockspeed, process clockspeed, and 
organization clockspeed.” (Fine, p. 6). Previous studies have looked at the impact of 
clockspeed on R&D (Mendelson and Pillai, 1998) and organizational structures 
(Mendelson, 2000). In a fast-clockspeed industry, the product life cycle is very short; 
technological change for both product and process development is rapid and technology 
depreciates quickly. Organizational forms are turbulent, as companies enter and leave, 
merge with or acquire each other, and spin-off off new companies. Although Fine’s main 
thesis is that design of the supply chain provides the firm’s ultimate core competency for 
maintaining advantage, his discussion of firm organization indicates that company 
systems, including HRM practices, affect performance and outcomes.  In his model, firms 
in industries with fast clockspeed must continually innovate in order to stay competitive 
and must adopt different strategies to remain competitive than firms in slow-clockspeed 
industries that evolve more slowly. 
  
 In the next section we draw upon these many streams of literature by sketching a 
model that connects a firm’s R&D decision, HRM practices and firm performance.  The 
underlying concept of the model is that HRM practices affect the cost structure of how 
firms adjust the skills of their workforce.  If technological investment is complementary 
to adjusting the workforce skills, firms HRM decisions and R&D decision will be related 
and will impact firm performance.   
 
 
3. Conceptual Framework of HRM System, Technology Investment, and Firm 
Performance 
 
Here we develop the conceptual framework that structures and informs our 
empirical analysis, which focuses on the relationship between firm performance and the 
firm’s human resource management (HRM) system, given its product market and the 
corresponding technology. Our framework depends upon several critical assumptions, 
which lead to our two sets of hypotheses. 
 
We assume that firm performance, especially worker productivity, will be 
impacted by the choice of HRM for given a technology, where technology is 
characterized by its length of product life (often called fast or slow clockspeed) or rate of 
change over time.  Further, we assume that firm assets have a high degree of technology 
specificity across generations so firms are locked in to a technology path.  Since we do 
not have direct data on the length of product life, we assume that product markets with 
short product life require relatively large R&D investments compared to product markets 
with long product life. 
 
Since we are analyzing only the high-tech electronics sector, the idea of different 
lengths of product life, or speed of technological change over time, may not be obvious. 
Let us look at examples from the semiconductor industry, which is one of the industries 
included in our sample, where graphic chips for video games typically have a generation 
life of approximately eighteen months and analogue chips typically have a generation life 
of five years. Memory chips and microprocessors typically have a generation life 
between two and three years. Generation life is critical in defining a firm’s constraints in 
making a return on investment, since product prices are above marginal costs early in the 
cycle before supply brings the prices down. Across the electronics industry more broadly, 
product life and speed of technological change has an even longer time horizon. For 
example, our sample also includes manufactures of “current-carrying wiring devices”.  In 
contrast to the semiconductor industry, the wire industry is marked by very long product 
life spans and low levels of innovation. 
 
The firm’s HRM system structures how labor inputs are bought and created over 
time. We assume the cost of labor inputs are determined by the following HRM practices: 
 
• screening and hiring, 
• skill development (both learning by doing and formal training), 
• retention of experienced workers, 
• adjustments in headcount by skill (quits and layoffs).  
 
At any given point in time, these HRM practices determine the cost and skills of the 
firm’s workforce. 
 
 How does the firm’s product life, and thus rate of R&D spending, affect how the 
HRM system operates? We assume that a new technology requires a mix of experience 
on the previous generation of technology and new skills that require formal education (or 
training). We further assume that the required formal education is much more time 
intensive for engineers than for direct labor. Firms in short product life markets, and thus 
with high R&D spending, must have a mix of engineers with the new skills required for 
the new technology and engineers with experience on the last generation of technology, 
and we assume that experience and new skills are complements. Firms in long product 
life markets, and thus with low R&D spending, rely more on a workforce with experience 
since workers focus on cutting costs, improving quality, and improving throughput over 
the life of the product. Firms must make two major decisions in creating the optimal skill-
experience composition in the workforce, and especially in the engineering workforce: 
 
1. decide whether to provide formal training in the new technology to their 
existing workers or to purchase these skills through new hires (we call this 
the make-buy decision); 
2. decide which experienced engineers (and other workers) they will retain 
(we call this the retention decision). 
 
The firm will make the first decision based upon the relative costs, including both the 
payroll costs and the time-to-market costs, of making or buying the required skills for the 
new technology.  The cost of “making” the required skills is the worker adjustment cost 
of acquiring skills (training cost) and is proportional to the size of technological jumps 
over a given time.  The cost of “buying” the required skills is the firm’s adjustment costs 
in hiring new workers, which is invariant to the size of the technological jump. Therefore, 
depending on firms’ underlying cost structures, for sufficiently large technological jumps, 
“buying” will be relatively less costly than “making” new skills. 
 
The second decision will depend upon the costs of retention as well as the production 
function.  Specifically, firms will structure incentive systems to retain the workers who 
are most valuable to the firm. For a new technology that requires new skills and 
restructures skill demand in the firm, the firm must decide which workers to retain.  This 
decision depends on the portfolio of skills supplied in the firm compared to the portfolio 
of skills necessary for the new technology, and the costs of obtaining the new portfolio, 
which include a comparison of the make decisions (primarily retraining costs) compared  
to buy decision (cost of new hires, layoffs, and worker morale).   The costs to workers of 
retraining depend on their opportunity wage and the required effort associated with 
retraining, which depends on how much retraining is required. Workers with skill sets far 
behind the latest technology will face higher retraining costs but require lower incentives 
by the firm for retention, while workers who are better matches to the new technology 
will face lower retraining costs lower and the incentives required by the firm for retention 
are higher.  
 
 What are the possible HRM systems that firms may set up as a result of the make-
buy and retention decisions? Following the literature (above), we define four HRM 
systems according to their reliance on internal rules (called internal labor markets or 
ILMs) or on the external labor market (called spot markets), with variation between the 
two extremes based on assumptions about the firm’s ability to identify worker talent and 
monitor performance. We characterize the HRM systems according to initial earnings 
(relative to market initial earnings), variance of earnings at points in time, wage growth 
over time, and separation rates, with these variable defined for specific cohorts of 
workers (i.e., same year of entry into firm). 
 
Bureaucratic ILM: Initial earnings of new hires are similar (low variance) since most 
workers enter at same level and have similar (and reliable) earnings growth. Firm 
experiences a low separation rate. 
 
Performance-based ILM: Entry of workers and their initial earnings reflect skill 
requirements, so average initial earnings of new hires are higher with higher variance 
than for bureaucratic ILM. After approximately two years, workers are selected (based 
upon performance) for faster career development and members of a cohort compete for 
entry into these favored positions, which have higher earnings growth and lower 
separation rates. Those who do not receive skill development have lower earnings growth 
and higher separation rates. 
 
Spot Market: Firm can identify workers’ talents and skills, and hire and pay accordingly 
(matching is good). Firm can monitor worker performance and pay worker according to 
contribution. Initial earnings and earnings growth reflect market rates for skill and talent, 
with large initial variance, and variance does not increase over tenure. Separation rate is 
higher than in ILMs. 
 
Spot Market with Rewards: Firm hires and pays workers as in spot market, but 
identification of worker’s talents and effort at hire is imperfect and monitoring of worker 
performance is imperfect. Variance of initial earnings is lower than in spot market. Firm 
must include performance rewards and tournament or wage-efficiency type incentives, 
thus variance of earnings increases over tenure. Earnings growth is higher than in spot 
market. Separation rate is higher than in spot market since the bad matches (both at hire 
and in rewards) end. 
 
Our assumptions about skill and experience requirements based upon the firm’s 
product market and R&D spending lead us to the following hypotheses about the 
relationship between choice of HRM and worker productivity: 
 
Hypothesis 1A: Firms with high R&D that choose an HRM system that allows hiring of 
workers with required skills will have higher worker productivity than those that create 
the required new skills through retraining of workers. 
 
If worker costs of retraining increases proportionally with size of technological 
change (as proxied by R&D), and firm hiring transaction costs are invariant to size of 
technological change, then R&D and flexible hiring practices will be positively related to 
worker productivity.  
 
Hypothesis 1B: Firms with high R&D that choose an HRM system that fosters retention 
of selected experienced workers will have higher worker productivity than those that do 
not have incentive/reward programs to retain selected workers. 
 
 In a competitive labor market, implementation of new technologies in an industry 
will impact the external market opportunities for engineers.  To counteract turnover of 
key workers, who are the workers with skills more compatible with the new technology, 
firms will structure their HRM system to provide incentives (both in compensation and in 
job assignment) in order to retain workers who match well to the new technology and 
who face lower personal retraining costs.  
 
We combine these two hypotheses into the following interacted hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1C: Firms with high R&D that choose a “Spot Market with Rewards” HRM 
system will have higher worker productivity than those that choose other HRM systems.   
 
The “Spot Market with Rewards” system provides high R&D firm with required 
new skills through new hires and flexibility to adjust the workforce. Firms with high 
R&D that choose a “Bureaucratic ILM” HRM system will have lower worker 
productivity than firms that choose other HRM systems, since this system requires firms 
to retrain workers and does not provide adequate flexibility to adjust the workforce.  
  
Hypothesis 2A: Firms with low R&D that choose an HRM system that allows some 
performance-based pay will have higher worker productivity. 
 
Firms with low R&D improve performance not through product market 
innovation, but through incremental improvement in the product and production process.  
Performance-based pay that is tied to improvements will motivate workers to higher 
productivity. 
 
Hypothesis 2B: Firms with low R&D that choose an HRM system that fosters retention 
of experienced workers will have higher worker productivity than those that do not have 
an incentive structure that reduces quits. 
 
The rationale underlying this hypothesis is similar to Hypothesis 1B.  In 
competitive labor markets, firms that do not provide incentives to retain key workers will 
lose their best workers to competitors who do provide incentives. 
 Again, we can combine these two hypotheses into the following interacted 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2C: Firms with low R&D that choose a “Performance-based ILM” HRM 
system will have higher worker productivity than firms that choose other HRM systems.   
 
The “Performance-based ILM” system provides workers with incentives to reduce 
costs and improve quality on a product over time, and creates an experienced workforce. 
Firms with low R&D that choose a “Spot Market” HRM system will have lower worker 
productivity than firms that choose other HRM systems, since this does not creates 
incentives for retention, and the loss of experienced workers will reduce the firm’s ability 
to reduce costs and improve quality.  
 
In the next section, we discuss the data and measures we will use to examine the 
previous hypotheses linking HRM practices to worker productivity for firms on different 
technological paths. 
 
 
4  Data Set and Measures 
 
As discussed in the framework above, we are investigating the relationship 
between firms’ productivity, their observed human resource management practices and 
their level of technology investment. To accomplish this goal we use data from three 
sources.  First, to characterize the human resource practices of firms and industries, we 
use data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics 
Program (LEHD). We then integrate LEHD data with information from the 1997 
Economic Censuses, which provide a set of measures to characterize the technological 
decisions across firms. Finally, we integrate information from Census/NSF R&D Surveys 
in 1991-98 to get data on R&D. 
 
4.1. The Analytical Dataset 
 
LEHD database consists of quarterly records of the employment and earnings of 
almost all individuals from the unemployment insurance systems of a number of US 
states in the 1990s.2  These data have been extensively described elsewhere (see 
Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer 2000; Abowd, Haltiwanger, and Lane 2004), but it is 
worth noting that these data have several advantages over household-based survey data. 
In particular, the earnings are quite accurately reported, since there are financial penalties 
                                                          
2
 Given the sensitive nature of the dataset, it is worth discussing the confidentiality protection in some 
detail. All data that are brought in to the LEHD system have been anonymized in the sense that standard 
identifiers and names are stripped off and replaced by a unique “Protected Identification Key” or PIK.  
Only Census Bureau employees or individuals who have Special Sworn Status are permitted to work with 
the data, and they have not only been subject to an FBI check but also are subject to a $250,000 fine and/or 
five years in jail if the identity of an individual or business is disclosed.  All projects have to be reviewed 
by the Census Bureau and other data custodians, and any tables or regression results that are released are 
subject to full disclosure review. 
for misreporting. The data are current, and the dataset is extremely large. The 
Unemployment Insurance records have also been matched to internal administrative 
records at the Census Bureau that contain information on date of birth, place of birth, 
race, and sex for all workers.  
 
In this study, we use data from LEHD for seven states, including some of the 
largest in the U.S., over the period 1992-2001. In characterizing the human resource 
practices of a firm, we utilize the measures of earnings, earnings growth, accession rate, 
and separation rate for selected cohorts within each firm. From the 1997 Economic 
Census, we obtain measures of revenue, material costs, total hours, capital stock, industry 
code, as well as establishment identifiers for almost the universe of establishments. The 
crosswalk between these files is based on 1987 SIC code for industry level sample and a 
common business-level identifier for establishment level sample.   
 
We use an establishment-level dataset in the Electronics Industry (SIC 35 and 36).  
We choose to focus on the electronics industry for this study because although the 
industry as a whole has experienced rapid technological change, sub industry groups (4-
digit SIC) and individual firms vary in their pace of technological change. 
 
4.2.  HRM Variables 
  
 In order to classify the HRM practices for each establishment in every quarter, we 
examine the following variables that make up components of firms’ HRM systems for a 
given occupation group such as engineers, direct labor, or administrative support: 
 
• Accession rate: Ratio of the total number of new hires to the total 
number of workers in 1997 
• Ratio of mean initial wage to market initial wage: Average wage of 
new hires of an individual establishment divided by average wage of 
new hires of all establishments in electronics industry (SIC 35 and 36) 
in 1997. 
• Standard deviation of initial earnings: Standard deviation of earnings 
of new hires in 1997. 
• Separation rate for workers with 2 years experience: Proportion of 
workers who are no longer working for a certain establishment in 1997 
among all workers who are hired in 1995 at the same establishment.  
• Within job wage growth for workers with 2 years experience: Wage 
growth between 1995 and 1997 of workers hired in 1995. 
• Standard deviation of earnings for workers with 2 years experience: 
Standard deviation of 1997 earnings of workers hired in 1995. 
• Separation rate of workers with 5 years experience: Proportion of 
workers who are no longer working for a certain establishment in 1997 
among all workers who are hired in 1992 at the same establishment.  
• Within job wage growth for workers with 5 years experience: Wage 
growth between 1992 and 1997 of workers hired in 1992. 
• Standard deviation of earnings for workers with 5 years experience: 
Standard deviation of 1997 earnings of workers hired in 1995. 
 
One limitation for this study is that we lack direct measures of some important 
worker and job characteristics, especially education and occupation. In order to analyze 
the relationship only on R&D and HRM for knowledge workers, we use imputed 
education values developed by the LEHD staff to distinguish knowledge workers from 
other types of workers.  In this paper we empirically examine not only all workers, but 
also workers imputed to have college degrees or more. 
 
4.3.  R&D Measure 
 
 In the empirical exercises, we examine the following variables to represent firm- 
level technology practices: 
 
• R&D spending rate: measured as the average total R&D costs per 
payroll over 1991-1998.  
 
Since Census/NSF R&D surveys are conducted at the firm level, we assume that 
all establishments of the same firm equally benefit from their firm level R&D.  
 
R&D is just one component of firms’ technology investment decisions, and as a 
result it is an imperfect proxy for investment in technology.  Also, since the relationship 
between R&D and new technology depends on the success of the investments and the 
length of period until implementation takes place, there may be an issue with the timing 
of investments and HRM choices.  We partition the firms in our sample into two sets: 
firms with above mean R&D investment and firms with below mean investment. 
 
4.4. Firm Performance Measure 
 
• Labor productivity: Log of real value added per total hours worked 
where the value added is the establishment level revenue adjusted for 
inventory change net of materials input, and total hours worked 
include both production worker hours and non-production worker 
hours. 
 
In the next section, we use the LEHD variables on HRM outcomes, R&D, and worker 
productivity to identify common HRM systems, the underlying HRM components that 
differentiate firms’ HRM systems, and the impact of these components on worker 
productivity. 
 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
 
First, we perform a cluster analysis of firm HRM practices to identify the most 
common HRM systems.  Next, we employ principal components analysis to identify 
groups of correlated HRM measures.  We then regress worker productivity over firm 
HRM components with R&D interaction to examine the statistical relationship of worker 
productivity with HRM practices for different technology paths.   
 
5.1  HRM Cluster Descriptions 
 
We perform cluster analysis to identify the most common bundles of HRM 
practices implemented by firms and to group firms with similar practices.  In order to 
maximize the degree of separations between the groups of firms, clusters of firms are 
based on canonical variables of HRM variables using Ward’s minimum variance method.  
In Ward's minimum-variance method, the distance between two clusters is the ANOVA 
sum of squares between the two clusters added up over all the variables.   At each 
generation, the within-cluster sum of squares is minimized over all partitions obtainable 
by merging two clusters from the previous generation (Ward 1963).   The assumptions 
under which Ward's method joins clusters to maximize the likelihood at each level of the 
hierarchy are multivariate normal mixture, equal spherical covariance matrices, and equal 
sampling probabilities.  Therefore, we first obtain approximate estimates of the pooled 
within-cluster covariance matrix of the HRM variables when the clusters are assumed to 
be multivariate normal with spherical covariance using the approximate covariance 
estimation for clustering developed by Art et al (1982), (ACECLUS).  The ACECLUS 
procedure provides us with canonical versions of earnings (or person and firm effect), 
earnings growth, and worker churning that we use in the cluster analysis. 
 
Under the assumption that firms implement different HRM systems for high-
skilled and low-skilled workers, we examine the HRM variables for high-education 
workers and for low-educated workers separately.  Summary statistics of the first four 
clusters of HRM practices for high-educated workers are reported in Table 1. Firms in 
cluster 1 offer low initial earnings, steady earnings growth, low turnover and low 
earnings dispersion, which are consistent with hiring less experienced workers and 
advancing them along well-defined pay scale, as in a bureaucratic ILM system.  Firms in 
Cluster 2 offer high initial wages with large variance, average earnings growth for the 
labor market, earnings dispersion that falls during first two years, high early turnover and 
low late turnover, which are consistent with good screening and matching at entry, as in a 
spot market,.  Cluster 3 has average initial earnings, high earnings growth with high 
earnings dispersion, high early turnover and high late turnover, which is consistent with 
pay tied to the external labor market at entry and then a tournament model to select 
workers for promotion or a wage-efficiency type incentives mechanism, as in a spot 
market with rewards.  Firms in cluster 4 have above-average initial earnings with 
moderate dispersion, below-average earnings growth, high earnings dispersion after two 
years, low early turnover and high late turnover, which is consistent with an ILM with 
multiple ports of entry and selection of workers for career development with turnover of 
workers not selected (a performance-based ILM).  The last group of firms represents the 
aggregation of multiple small clusters that are not disclosable according to Census 
Bureau confidentiality requirements.  Firms are concentrated in cluster 1: 58% of all 
firms are in cluster 1, 20% are in cluster 2, 16% are in cluster 3, and 4% are in cluster 4 
and it appears that the primary variables in differentiating systems is wage variation and 
initial earnings. 
 
In Table 2, we classify firms as high- or low-R&D firms based on whether their 
R&D investment is above or below the mean, and then present the cluster sizes of HRM 
practices for high-educated workers at different levels of R&D.  First, the R&D 
distribution is quite skew with 59% of all firms above the mean.  Within each R&D 
bracket, we observe different distributions of firms across the HRM clusters.  Low R&D 
firms are over-represented in the “Bureaucratic ILM cluster” (i.e. 65% are in cluster 1), 
high R&D firms are over-represented in the “Bureaucratic ILM cluster” and “Spot-
market cluster” (i.e., 52% are in cluster 1 and 25% are in cluster 2). Altogether, the low 
R&D firms are more likely than the high R&D firms to have ILM-style HRM; clusters 1 
and 4 represent 70% of low R&D firms and 55% of high R&D firms. Spot market-style 
HRM is more likely to be found at high R&D firms (41% are in clusters 2 and 3) than at 
low R&D firms (29%).  The high R&D sample also has more firms in the residual 
category (4% relative to 2% for low R&D firms).   
 
We perform the same cluster analysis on low educated worker outcomes (see 
Table 3).  For low-educated workers, the first cluster dominates, representing 82% of all 
firms.  Cluster 1 represents a bureaucratic ILM with low initial earnings and low 
variance, steady earnings growth, and low earnings dispersion.  Cluster 2 represents a 
spot market with matching at entry with above average earnings that reflects workers’ 
skill and experience, average earnings growth.  This cluster comprises 16% of firms in 
the industry.  The third cluster represents a performance-based ILM where firms hire 
experienced and skilled workers and so have high initial earnings, have low turnover for 
first two years, have high earnings growth after two years with large wage dispersion as 
selected workers have career development and advancement. Cluster 3 represents less 
than 1% of all firms.  Cluster 4 represents a spot market with rewards, with high initial 
earnings that reflects workers’ skill and experience, high earnings growth, a very high 
separation rate as workers who do not get advanced are separated, and large variance in 
earnings, especially at the end of five years. This cluster makes up about 1.5% of the 
sample.  As with the high-educated clusters, the last group represents several small 
clusters aggregated for disclosure purposes.  Also, we are unable to present cluster sizes 
by R&D levels for HRM systems of low-educated workers because several of the cells 
are too small to disclose. 
 
Firms are more dispersed in their choice of HRM systems for high educated 
workers than for low educated workers.  For low educated workers, 82% of firms 
implement a bureaucratic ILM system; for high educated workers, 58% of firms 
implement a bureaucratic ILM system. The next most common HRM system 
implemented in this high-tech industry is a spot market, which matches workers at entry.  
For low educated workers, 16% of firms had a spot market HRM system; for high 
educated workers, 20% of firms had a spot market HRM system. 
 
5.2  HRM Principal Components Analysis 
 
In this section we examine our nine underlying HRM measures for each education 
group to identify correlations between the variables in firms’ HRM implementations.  
Principal components analysis constructs the correlation matrix for our underlying 
variables and then constructs components that are linear combinations of the underlying 
variables using eigenvectors of the correlation matrix as coefficients.  These principal 
components are then ordered by variance and the largest components are retained, and 
then rotated to ease interpretation.  In other words, each component is a linear 
combination of the underlying variables, and we retain the combinations that capture the 
most variance in the underlying data and then rotate the axes to facilitate interpretation of 
the components.  We will focus on two sets of data: HRM outcomes for high-educated 
workers and HRM outcomes for low-educated workers. 
 
In Table 4, we present a summary of the variance explained by each set of 
components, as a proportion of the eigenvalue from each corresponding principal 
component. We present results for the set of nine HRM measures for each education 
group.  We find that for both education groups, there is a lead HRM component with 
several secondary components of equal importance.  In both cases, the first component 
has a relatively large amount of explanatory power; the next several components are 
relatively equal in magnitude.  For the subsequent analysis we focus on six components, 
which explain 85% of the variance for the set of high educated worker variables and 91% 
of the variance for the set of low educated worker variables. 
 
The first six components from the principal components analysis were 
orthogonally transformed through a varimax rotation.  Table 5 reports the rotated 
component pattern matrix for high educated workers. The first component, which we 
label as “ports of entry,” corresponds to a high level of initial earnings relative to market, 
and a high standard deviation in initial earnings.  This is the lead component and 
indicates how many ports of entry are used by the firm, as opposed to hiring at an entry 
level and promoting from within.  A high value on this component describes firms that 
hire workers at many different levels of experience and skill, which increases the level 
and variance in initial earnings.  The second component, labeled “turnover rate,” reflects 
a high separation rate of high-educated workers after two and five years of tenure.  The 
third component, labeled “performance incentives,” corresponds to a high level of within-
job wage growth and large earnings variance at the fifth year of tenure, which indicates 
that by this point the firm has selected certain workers for career development and 
advancement.  The fourth component, “wage growth” reflects high levels of within-job 
wage growth at both the second and fifth years of tenure.  The fifth component, “hiring 
rate” simply reflects the overall hiring rate in 1997.  The sixth component, “early sorting” 
reflects the standard deviation of wages in the second year of tenure.  Subject to a 
threshold test of .50 for significance, each HR variable has a significant loading in at least 
one component. The within-job wage growth at five years tenure is the only HR variable 
that has a split loading over components 3 and 4.  
 
In Table 6, to check the correspondence between the components and the 
underlying variables, we present the means of each component for the HRM clusters 
from the previous section.  Cluster 1, the bureaucratic ILM system, has low average 
values across all the components.  The cluster has notably low values for the ports of 
entry, performance incentives, and early sorting components which captures the few ports 
of entry, low wage variation and low growth of this HRM system.  Cluster 2, the spot 
market system, has a very high average value on ports of entry, and low values for 
performance incentives and hiring rate, which is as expected.  Cluster 3, the spot-market 
with rewards system has high turnover rate, high performance incentives and high wage 
growth, and a low value for early sorting, which indicates that the performance incentive 
or tournament does not take place until after the first two years and that the “losers” tend 
to leave. Cluster 4, performance-based ILM, has extremely high early matching, low 
performance incentives, and low wage growth, which is consistent with a workers being 
selected for career development during the first two years and then earnings paths 
diverge. The turnover rate mean combines the low turnover rate at two years and as well 
as the high turnover rate at five years. 
 
As demonstrated in Table 2, firms with different R&D levels exhibit differences 
in HRM practices.  We further summarize the components by presenting component 
means by R&D level for high-educated workers.  Table 7 demonstrates that relative to 
low R&D firms, high R&D firms exhibit higher values for ports of entry, turnover, wage 
growth, hiring rate, and early sorting.   These differences are consistent with the 
suggestion that high R&D firms are more likely to implement an HRM system that 
allows flexibility in hiring and retention. 
 
We repeat principal component analysis for low educated workers.  In Table 8 we present 
the component matrix for low educated workers.  As with high education workers, 
similar “ports of entry”, “wage growth”, and “hiring rate” components appear for the low 
education HRM variables.  The component corresponding to “performance incentives,” 
however, reflects higher variance in wages for 2nd and 5th year-tenure workers, which 
reflects performance-based pay. This is the lead component. Turnover rates earlier in a 
worker’s career and turnover later in a worker’s career appear as separate components, 
and firm practices vary across these two dimensions for low education workers. Subject 
to a .50 threshold test for significance, each HR variable has a significant loading in 
exactly one of these six components. For disclosure reasons we are unable to report 
component means by clusters or R&D levels for low education workers. 
 
5.3 Worker Productivity Regressions  
 
Next, we map the HRM variables for each firm to continuous variables 
corresponding to the components identified above, and consider the impact of these HRM 
components on firm performance.  Specifically we regress productivity on the principal 
HRM components both with and without interaction with R&D spending.  We measure 
firm performance as log worker productivity, and control for log of physical capital and 
product market at the 4-digit SIC.  We estimate two specifications, one specification with 
no R&D interactions, and a second specification where R&D categories (high, low) are 
interacted with the HRM components.  We estimate separate regressions for low 
education and high education workers.  We use the components as regressors instead of 
the underlying HRM variables, which tend to be highly correlated by type of practice, to 
facilitate interpretation.   
 
For the high education HRM components, we observe that several HRM 
components are related to worker productivity (see Table 9).  In support of Hypothesis 
1A, firms with multiple ports of entry, which facilitate the hiring of workers with 
required skills, have higher labor productivity. As hypothesized, this effect is more 
important (and significant) in the high R&D firms.  Firms with performance incentive 
mechanisms appear to have higher labor productivity, which supports Hypotheses 1B and 
2A. This appears to be significant for both low and high R&D firms, with the coefficient 
on performance incentives for low R&D firms higher than the coefficient for high R&D 
firms. Performance-based pay appears to be even more important in low R&D firms than 
in high R&D firms. Firms with higher separation (turnover) rates appear to have lower 
firm performance, although this is significant only for high R&D firms, supporting 
Hypothesis 1B but not Hypothesis 2B.  The effect of turnover rate on worker productivity 
appears to only be significant for high R&D firms, supporting Hypothesis 2B. Since these 
statistical relationships have not controlled for firms growing or shrinking, separation 
rates and hiring rates may reflect poor performing firms losing workers and high 
performing firms adding workers.3.  Note that wage growth and early sorting for high 
educated workers do not seem to be related to productivity. 
 
In Table 10, we present the regression results for low education HRM 
components.  Examining the impact of HRM components of low-education workers, we 
observe that the existence of performance incentives for both high- and low- R&D firms 
correspond to higher firm performance, with the effect greater for high R&D firms.  
These results support hypotheses 1B and 2A. Separation rates vary in their relationship 
with productivity in high R&D firms according to the timing of the separation. Early 
turnover corresponds strongly to lower productivity, and late turnover is neutral. These 
results partially support Hypothesis 1B, in that early retention seems to matter. However, 
long-run retention does not appear to matter for low educated workers. Separation rates 
do not appear related to productivity in low R&D firms, which does not support 
Hypotheses 1B and 2B for low educated workers. Note that ports of entry are not 
significantly related to productivity, which does not support Hypothesis 1A for low 
educated workers, so that firms’ ability to hire workers by their skills and experience 
does not seem to matter at the low end of the skill spectrum. We also observe that higher 
hiring rates for high R&D firms appear to correspond to higher firm performance, 
although not for low R&D firms.  This may reflect that high R&D firms are both more 
productive and growing more than low R&D firms.   
 
Overall the regression results provide some preliminary evidence against 
hypotheses 1C and 2C.  Contrary to hypothesis 1C, the analysis suggests that the 
performance-based ILM outperforms the spot market with rewards system for high R&D 
firms, since turnover corresponds to lower productivity, which is the main differentiator 
of the two types of systems, since both systems require multiple ports of entry and 
performance incentives.  ILMs rely upon salary schedules to maintain norms of fairness 
and to lower turnover, while the spot market attempts to replicate opportunity wages and 
does not attempt to reduce turnover except for the few selected workers who receive the 
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 Note that bootstrapped standard errors and pair-wise significance tests are forthcoming, along with 
controls for firms growing or shrinking. 
highest rewards (i.e. win the tournament).  For low R&D firms, performance incentives 
appear to be the only HRM practice associated with productivity, and so we cannot 
distinguish between the relative performance of the performance-based ILM and the spot 
market with rewards.  Further analysis will include a more rigorous test of this 
hypotheses accounting for bundling of HRM practices.   
 
 
6.  Discussion and Future Work 
 
This paper has examined the relationship between firms’ technology investment 
decisions, HRM practices, and productivity. Our preliminary results indicate that firms 
with high levels of R&D investment are likely to benefit from HRM systems with 
multiple ports of entry, performance incentives, and lower turnover, while firms with low 
R&D are likely to benefit from HRM systems with performance incentives. These results 
indicate that high R&D firms are more likely to buy new skills compared to low R&D 
firms, and yet these high R&D firms suffer if they lose too many experienced workers.  
Although the results on the relationship of hiring rate and turnover on firm performance 
may just capture whether firms are shrinking or growing, the differences in impact across 
R&D levels can not be fully explained by this.  
 
 In support of the assumption that the costs of training workers to acquire new 
skills associated with a technological leap are proportional to the size of the innovation, 
while the costs of hiring workers with the necessary skills are invariant to the size of the 
innovation, we find that high R&D firms are more likely to implement HRM systems 
consistent with buying new skills than low R&D firms.   
 
 A strength of this research is the richness of the data set.  There is very little 
research that ties firm level HRM systems to performance outcomes: the LEHD data 
allows us to begin analyzing systems and outcomes within firms for a large sample of 
firms.  While the LEHD data provide ample sample sizes and longitudinal variation, the 
lack of direct measures of worker’s skills or occupation and of technological change 
constrains the statistical estimation and limits our interpretation of the results.  
  
Next steps include implementation of bootstrapping to correctly estimate standard 
errors of regressions with principal components, inclusion of additional measures of 
HRM practices and measures of firm performance and productivity, controls for whether 
a firm is growing or shrinking, and tests of different specifications with a focus on the 
measurement of synergies between HRM components, and robustness tests covering 
different methodologies. 
 
Although these results must be interpreted with care, they have potential 
implications for understanding the mechanisms that tie together technological change and 
workers outcomes.  Because technological change impacts workers at the plant level, 
knowledge of how HRM systems interact with technological investment to drive 
productivity at the plant level will inform our understanding of how labor markets work 
in technologically dynamic industries.     
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Table 1.  HRM System Clusters for High Education Workers
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Variable
Bureaucratic 
ILM Spot Market
Spot Market 
w/Rewards
Performance-
Based ILM
Accession rate 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.14
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.09)
Ratio of mean initial wage to market initial wage 0.70 1.12 0.83 0.97 1.02 0.82
(0.26) (0.34) (0.35) (0.41) (0.41) (0.34)
Std. dev. of initial earnings 4,858 13,923 7,622 6,927 9,318 7,331
(2,531) (8,155) (4,453) (6,067) (5,806) (5,899)
Separation rate at 2 years tenure 0.41 0.44 0.47 0.39 0.48 0.43
(0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.20)
Within job wage growth at 2 years tenure 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07)
Std. dev. of wages at 2 years tenure 4,917 5,303 5,530 25,601 8,718 5,937
(3,587) (3,039) (3,747) (11,260) (5,449) (5,584)
Separation rate at 5 years tenure 0.42 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.48 0.43
(0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18)
Within job wage growth at 5 years tenure 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Std. dev. of wages at 5 years tenure 6,133 6,778 18,672 7,196 79,100 10,540
(2,906) (2,776) (6,987) (4,398) (31,481) (14,681)
N 425 149 116 26 23 739
Notes: Table shows within-cluster means. Standard deviations in parentheses.
SampleResidual Firms
  
 
Table 2. High Education HRM Cluster Sizes by Firm R&D Level
Cluster 1: Bureaucratic ILM 197 (65.2%) 228 (75.5%)
Cluster 2: Spot Market 38 (12.6%) 111 (36.8%)
Cluster 3: Spot Market w/Rewards 47 (15.6%) 69 (22.8%)
Cluster 4: Performance-Based ILM 15 (5.0%) 11 (3.6%)
5 (1.7%) 18 (6.0%)
Notes: Column percentages given in parentheses. See text for definition of clusters.
Low R&D 
Firms
High R&D 
Firms
Residual Firms
Table 3. HRM System Clusters for Low Education Workers
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Variable
Bureaucratic 
ILM Spot Market
Performance-
Based ILM
Spot Market 
w/Rewards
Accession rate 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.29 0.27 0.18
(0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.11)
Ratio of mean initial wage to market initial wage 1.04 1.18 1.60 1.38 1.56 1.07
(0.40) (0.48) (0.40) (0.41) (0.37) (0.42)
Std. dev. of initial earnings 4,827 5,319 9,980 7,594 7,968 4,994
(3,830) (3,189) (7,276) (3,852) (2,204) (3,808)
Separation rate at 2 years tenure 0.47 0.47 0.37 0.47 0.55 0.47
(0.17) (0.19) (0.12) (0.21) (0.25) (0.17)
Within job wage growth at 2 years tenure 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.07
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (0.00) (0.07)
Std. dev. of wages at 2 years tenure 4,051 4,792 6,868 6,715 34,574 4,309
(3,322) (3,123) (4,267) (3,674) (3,748) (3,681)
Separation rate at 5 years tenure 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.59 0.64 0.48
(0.16) (0.17) (0.08) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16)
Within job wage growth at 5 years tenure 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
Std. dev. of wages at 5 years tenure 4,131 12,489 213,728 51,455 23,043 7,859
(1,703) (6,173) (187,269) (11,967) (3,992) (25,090)
N 612 116 5 11 3 747
Notes: Table shows within-cluster means. Standard deviations in parentheses.
SampleResidual Firms
Table 4.  Explained Variance by HRM Components
% of variance 
explained
Cumulative 
explained 
variance
% of variance 
explained
Cumulative 
explained 
variance
Component 1 0.268 0.268 0.279 0.279
Component 2 0.173 0.441 0.185 0.465
Component 3 0.134 0.575 0.159 0.624
Component 4 0.108 0.683 0.136 0.760
Component 5 0.087 0.770 0.092 0.852
Component 6 0.080 0.850 0.060 0.912
Component 7 0.056 0.906 0.052 0.963
Component 8 0.051 0.957 0.024 0.987
Component 9 0.043 1.000 0.013 1.000
High Edu Low Edu
Notes: Variance explained by relative weights of each factor's eigenvalues from a 
principal components analysis.
Table 5. HRM Component Patterns For High Education Workers
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5 Component 6
Variable: Ports of Entry Turnover Rate
Performance 
Incentives Wage Growth Hiring Rate Early Sorting
Accession rate 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.03 0.95 0.02
Ratio of mean initial wage to market initial wage 0.85 0.13 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.23
Std. dev. of initial earnings 0.86 0.05 0.18 0.04 0.06 -0.11
Separation rate at 2 years tenure 0.03 0.91 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.12
Within job wage growth over first 2 years tenure -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.96 -0.02 0.06
Std. dev. of wages at 2 years tenure 0.07 -0.01 0.19 0.06 0.02 0.94
Separation rate at 5 years tenure 0.19 0.76 -0.02 -0.05 0.32 0.17
Within job wage growth over first 5 years tenure 0.17 -0.02 0.62 0.52 0.27 -0.02
Std. dev. of wages at 5 years tenure 0.15 0.04 0.90 -0.05 -0.04 0.23
Notes: Component pattern matrix from the top 6 components of a principle components analysis with varimax rotation. Weights  .50 are boldfaced.
Table 6. High Education Component Means for High Education HRM Clusters
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Bureaucratic 
ILM Spot Market
Spot Market 
w/Rewards
Performance-
Based ILM
Component 1: Ports of Entry -0.274 0.572 -0.079 0.103 0.028
Component 2: Turnover Rate -0.080 0.020 0.214 -0.001 0.211
Component 3: Performance Incentives -0.116 -0.327 0.151 -0.513 1.359
Component 4: Wage Growth -0.004 -0.050 0.139 -0.165 -0.028
Component 5: Hiring Rate -0.011 -0.223 -0.039 0.072 0.630
Component 6: Early Matching -0.144 -0.017 -0.134 1.574 -0.029
425 149 116 26 23
Notes: See text for definition of clusters and components. 
N
Residual Firms
Table 7. High Education HRM Component Means by Firm R&D Level
Low R&D 
Firms
High R&D 
Firms
Component 1: Ports of Entry -0.248 0.086
Component 2: Turnover Rate -0.024 0.014
Component 3: Performance Incentives -0.096 -0.077
Component 4: Wage Growth -0.057 0.045
Component 5: Hiring Rate -0.132 0.032
Component 6: Early Matching -0.139 0.006
302 437
Notes: See text for definition of components.
N
Table 8. HRM Component Patterns for Low Education Workers
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5 Component 6
Variable:
Performance 
Incentives Ports of Entry Wage Growth Hiring Rate Early Turnover Late Turnover
Accession rate 0.06 -0.01 0.11 0.97 0.04 0.12
Ratio of mean initial wage to market initial wage 0.15 0.92 0.01 0.01 -0.10 0.08
Std. dev. of initial earnings 0.00 0.95 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.00
Separation rate at 2 years tenure 0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.97 0.21
Within job wage growth over first 2 years tenure 0.00 -0.02 0.93 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06
Std. dev. of wages at 2 years tenure 0.95 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.07
Separation rate at 5 years tenure 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.13 0.22 0.96
Within job wage growth over first 5 years tenure 0.30 0.09 0.72 0.31 0.02 0.10
Std. dev. of wages at 5 years tenure 0.96 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.02
Notes: Component pattern matrix from the top 6 components of a principle components analysis with varimax rotation. Weights  .50 are boldfaced.
Table 9. High Education HRM Components on Firm Performance
(1) (2)
Intercept 2.1152 2.1649
(0.2641) *** (0.2672) ***
ln(K/L) 0.2978 0.2971
(0.0303) *** (0.0305) ***
C1: Ports of Entry 0.0739
(0.0268) **
C1 × Low R&D 0.0340
(0.0328)
C1 × High R&D 0.1323 **
(0.0537)
C2: Turnover rate -0.0492 *
(0.0264)
C2 × Low R&D 0.0070
(0.0408)
C2 × High R&D -0.0753 **
(0.0346)
C3: Performance Incentives 0.0800 **
(0.0265)
C3 × Low R&D 0.2072
(0.0968) **
C3 × High R&D 0.0783
(0.0301) **
C4: Wage growth -0.0042
(0.0247)
C4 × Low R&D -0.0177
(0.0345)
C4 × High R&D 0.0154
(0.0358)
C5: Hiring rate 0.0302
(0.0259)
C5 × Low R&D 0.0473
(0.0567)
C5 × High R&D 0.0285
(0.0291)
C6: Early matching 0.0303
(0.0252)
C6 × Low R&D 0.0619
(0.0906)
C6 × High R&D 0.0297
(0.0276)
R² 0.66 0.66
N 760 760
Notes: Dependent variable is log worker productivity. Both specifications include controls 
for 4-digit SIC. Standard errors in parentheses.
* Denotes significance at the 10% level
** Denotes significance at the 5% level
*** Denotes significance at the 1% level
Table 10. Low Education HRM Components on Firm Performance
(1) (2)
Intercept 2.2624 2.0525
(0.2389) *** (0.2725) ***
ln(K/L) 0.3097 0.3090
(0.0300) *** (0.0302) ***
C1: Performance incentives 0.0638
(0.0251) **
C1 × Low R&D 0.0516
(0.0262) **
C1 × High R&D 0.2440
(0.1124) **
C2: Ports of entry 0.0313
(0.0246)
C2 × Low R&D 0.0186
(0.0301)
C2 × High R&D 0.0605
(0.0433)
C3: Wage growth 0.0225
(0.0245)
C3 × Low R&D 0.0129
(0.0345)
C3 × High R&D 0.0516
(0.0350)
C4: Hiring rate 0.0475
(0.0258) *
C4 × Low R&D 0.0528
(0.0488)
C4 × High R&D 0.0587
(0.0306) **
C5: Early turnover -0.1038
(0.0250) ***
C5 × Low R&D -0.0491
(0.0413)
C5 × High R&D -0.1263
(0.0316) ***
C6: Late turnover -0.0083
(0.0268)
C6 × Low R&D 0.0212
(0.0436)
C6 × High R&D -0.0279
(0.0334)
R² 0.66 0.66
N 760 760
Notes: Dependent variable is log worker productivity. Both specifications include controls for 
4-digit SIC. Standard errors in parentheses.
* Denotes significance at the 10% level
** Denotes significance at the 5% level
*** Denotes significance at the 1% level
 
